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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FUJIMORI TRIAL 
JUAN E. MENDEZ* 
The conviction and sentencing of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori for 
human rights crimes in Lima, Peru deserves more attention than it 
gets from international public opinion. For this reason, the American 
University International Law Review is to be commended for 
bringing to its readers an excerpt1 in English of this remarkable 
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Criminal Court, as well as Co-Chair of the Human Rights Institute of the 
International Bar Association.  A native of Argentina, Mr. Méndez has dedicated 
his legal career to the defense of human rights and has a long and distinguished 
record of advocacy throughout the Americas, for which he has been internationally 
recognized.  As a result of his involvement in representing political prisoners, the 
Argentinean military dictatorship arrested him and subjected him to torture and 
administrative detention for more than a year. During this time, Amnesty 
International adopted him as a “Prisoner of Conscience.” After his expulsion from 
his country in 1977, Mr. Méndez moved to the United States. Since that time, he 
has served as the general counsel of Human Rights Watch, the Executive Director 
of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights in Costa Rica, and president of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of 
American States. Until May 2009 he was the President of the International Center 
for Transnational Justice (“ICTJ”) and in the summer of 2009 he was a Scholar-in-
Residence at the Ford Foundation in New York.  Concurrent with his duties at 
ICTJ, the Honorable Kofi Annan named Mr. Méndez his Special Advisor on the 
Prevention of Genocide, a task he performed from 2004 to 2007. Mr.  Méndez was 
Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Civil and Human Rights at the 
University of Notre Dame, has also taught international human rights law at 
Georgetown Law School and at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies, and he also teaches regularly at the Oxford Master’s Program 
in International Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom. Mr. Méndez is a 
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of Columbia, U.S., having earned a J.D. from Stella Maris University in Argentina 
and a certificate from the American University Washington College of Law. Mr. 
Méndez would like to thank Kavita Kapur and Nayna Malayang for their research 
assistance. 
 1. The original Spanish language document constitutes “a slection of 
paragraphs from the judgment” that the Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme 
Court made available to the public shortly after the Court rendered its decision. 
The Judgment Against Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 25 AM U. INT’L L. 
650 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:649 
 
decision. The successful conduct of the trial and the exemplary 
treatment by Peruvian judges of highly complex issues of criminal 
law and procedure is pathbreaking in more ways than one. While the 
decision is a “first” in some significant ways, it is not completely 
isolated or unique in the arena of global legal developments. In fact, 
perhaps the most salient feature of the decision is that it reflects a 
trend amongst democratic states to break the cycle of impunity for 
major human rights crimes. 
Fujimori is not the first former head of State to be prosecuted for 
human rights violations, but he is probably the first one who was, at 
the time he committed his crimes, an elected head of State and one 
who enjoyed broad popular support in his time.2 In Argentina, 
Generals Jorge Videla and Roberto Viola, who had been Presidents 
at different times during the military dictatorship, were convicted and 
sentenced in the celebrated “trial of the Juntas” in the 1980s.3 But 
both of them—and their co-defendant Junta members—had seized 
power by force, not through elections. In addition, their sentences 
were cut short by Presidential pardons issued a few years later. 
Videla is back in custody and facing trial for other crimes in the new 
wave of prosecutions in Argentina, and Viola died on September 30, 
1994. Another former head of State, Maria Estela (“Isabel”) 
Martinez de Peron, is facing trial for crimes committed by 
paramilitary forces acting under her government before the military 
coup of 1976.4 Peron, who has not yet been convicted, had been 
elected Vice-President and had assumed the presidency after the 
 
REV. 657 (Aimee Sullivan trans., 2010) [hereinafter Judgment Against Fujimori]. 
 2. Joshua Partlow & Lucien Chauvin, Peru’s Fujimori Gets 25 Years, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 8, 2009 (“Many people in Peru admire Fujimori for largely defeating 
the Shining Path insurgency and ending a two-decade war that left about 70,000 
people dead.”); see also Oxford Analytica, Fujimori Ruling Stands, FORBES.COM, 
Jan. 8, 2010, available at http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/07/lima-peru-fujimori-
business-supreme-court-oxford.html. 
 3. See generally Paula K. Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta: 
Responsibilities and Realities, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 491 (1987) 
(providing background on the trial). 
 4. Extradition of Isabel Perón to Argentina Is Rejected by Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E 
5D71330F93AA15757C0A96E9C8B63&scp=1&sq=Mar%C3%ADa%20Estela%
20Mart%C3%ADnez%20de%20Per%C3%B3n%20extradite&st=cse# (remarking 
that Spain’s National Court refused to extradite Perón to Argentina). 
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death of her husband, Juan D. Peron. In Chile, General Augusto 
Pinochet was finally stripped of immunity and prosecuted, but he 
died before the courts could rule on his crimes. In Uruguay, a court 
recently convicted Jose Maria Bordaberry and his Foreign Minister 
for human rights crimes committed in the 1970s; but although a 
civilian, Bordaberry had presided over a military dictatorship and 
was never elected.  
In any event, the fact that Fujimori was elected and popular should 
not—and did not—shield him from prosecution and trial. In practice, 
Fujimori had himself run roughshod over the Peruvian Constitution, 
dissolving Congress and the courts in the infamous “self-coup” of 
April 5, 1992. He was found responsible for the massacre of civilians 
in Barrios Altos and the disappearance and murder of students and a 
professor from La Cantuta University, not for his other violations of 
the rule of law.5 And yet his conviction is an important lesson on 
what happens to a country when popularly elected leaders turn their 
mandate into a license for autocracy and break any limit to the 
exercise of power. 
The case against Fujimori was already a landmark in a sense that 
has mostly been forgotten now: it became possible because the 
Supreme Court of Chile allowed his extradition to face these charges. 
After his fall from grace (he had attempted to steal the 2000 elections 
and his regime entered into a rapid internal decomposition), Fujimori 
had fled to Japan. Attempts to extradite him from Japan met stiff 
resistance from the Japanese government that considered him a 
Japanese citizen. Perhaps in an attempt to make a political comeback 
in Peru, he had made a surprise landing in Chile, where the courts 
were considered very conservative on matters of extradition and 
likely to accept the “political crimes” exception to extradition in his 
case. In fact, after a well-argued process, the Supreme Court of Chile 
granted his extradition on all the counts for which he was sought, 
including the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta episodes and the arbitrary 
arrest of a journalist and a businessman. Remarkably, during the 
course of the extradition process the Inter-American Court and 
Commission on Human Rights had urged all signatories to the 
American Convention on Human Rights to cooperate with each other 
 
 5. Judgment Against Fujimori, supra note 1, at 834-36, ¶ 823. 
652 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:649 
 
in attaining judicial accountability for major human rights crimes. In 
the past, Latin American judiciaries were more inclined to accept a 
loose interpretation of the political exception to extradition doctrine, 
especially when applied to former heads of State. However, 
beginning in the 1980s, in a climate of change and a trend towards 
democratization, the Brazilian Supreme Court had granted the 
extradition to Argentina of Mario Eduardo Firmenich, the head of the 
Montoneros guerrillas.6 The Chilean decision and the positions 
adopted by the Inter-American organs of human rights protection 
signal in no uncertain terms that the political character of a criminal 
offense that constitutes a crime against humanity will be no bar to 
extradition. 
The Fujimori case demonstrates that highly charged, politically 
volatile cases can nevertheless be tried with the most scrupulous 
respect for fair trial and due process guarantees. I had the privilege of 
observing some of the early proceedings as President of the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Later, ICTJ 
conducted a year-long trial observation mission involving other 
colleagues and specially invited jurists, as well as local counsel. The 
mission observed every aspect of every motion and public hearing 
and concluded that the three-member panel that conducted the trial 
had lived up to every major principle of due process of law 
prescribed in international covenants and recognized by all civilized 
nations. This applies not only to Fujimori’s defense, but also to the 
representation of victims through “private prosecutors” as allowed in 
Peruvian law. This is remarkable for a judiciary that did not until 
then enjoy a high measure of confidence among the citizenry and 
that had traditionally been relegated by successive governments as a 
minor branch of government attracting limited resources and unable 
to retain major legal talent. In fact, during the Fujimori dictatorship 
the judiciary had been manipulated in the crudest ways and its 
independence and impartiality were severely undermined. And yet 
the Peruvian courts showed to the world that self-respecting courts 
 
 6. José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by 
Former Governments: Applicable Principles and Political Contraints, 13 
HAMLINE L. REV.  623, 624, 646-654 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of 
public disclosure and “knowledge of the truth” in carrying out legitimate 
prosecutions). 
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can in fact and in law provide guarantees of fair trial even in the most 
challenging circumstances.  
Readers unfamiliar with the present state of Peruvian politics may 
be forgiven for thinking that this decision is a form of “victors’ 
justice,” legitimate on its own terms but only possible because the 
political winds are now unfavorable to Fujimori. That is not so, and 
the reality highlights the remarkable achievement of the Peruvian 
judiciary. It is true that the process of accountability started in 2001 
during a period of quick democratization and enthusiasm for human 
rights. As years have gone by, however, the political fortunes have 
changed. President Alan Garcia and his Aprista party are no big fans 
of accountability. In the first place, Garcia himself was President 
previously in the 1980s, and his period was attended by very severe 
human rights violations in the context of counter-terrorism 
campaigns.7 In addition, representation in Congress is highly 
fractured and his own bloc depends heavily on an alliance with the 
remnants of the Fujimori party. The latter represents roughly 20-25% 
of the electorate, and Fujimori’s daughter was the highest vote-getter 
in the most recent elections for Congress; she plans to run for 
President and actively campaigns on the promise to pardon her 
father.8 In such a political climate, the judiciary enjoys respect (some 
enthusiastic, some reluctant) from politicians and the press; but it is 
frequently the target of serious misrepresentations and ad hominem 
attacks.  
Fujimori was found guilty of these crimes although he did not 
materially commit them. The evidence showed they were perpetrated 
by a clandestine group called “Colina,” consisting of officers and 
non-commissioned officers of the Peruvian Army. The group was 
constituted by the high command in an official though secret manner. 
It functioned through irregular channels but under orders and control 
 
 7. Lisa J. LaPlante, Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: 
Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 51, 70 (2007) (“The highest number of diappearances and extrajudicial 
killings [in Peru] were associated with the government of Alan Garcia in the 1980s 
. . . .”). 
 8. Simon Romero, Peru’s Ex-President Convited of Rights Abuses, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/ 
world/americas/08fujimori.html. 
654 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:649 
 
of the high command, at which Fujimori occupied the highest 
position. In this sense, the court found Fujimori guilty of committing 
these crimes through the authorship of others; Fujimori’s is a 
“mediated authorship” (autoria mediata), i.e., by availing himself of 
the services of actors willing and able to commit the crimes at his 
behest. The decision takes pain to point out the specific pieces of 
evidence that establish this form of responsibility, and to bring to 
bear precedents in other jurisdictions, including international 
criminal tribunals. It must be noted, however, that “mediated 
authorship” is the genre of doctrines under which those giving orders 
are made responsible for the results of their criminal intent. It is not 
an issue of instigation or complicity but of authorship. In war crimes, 
the responsibility of the superior is generally established through the 
notion of “command responsibility,” which attributes to the 
commanding officer a responsibility for overseeing and controlling 
subordinates. Since the crime was committed by active duty officers 
and Fujimori was, in law and in fact, the commander in chief of the 
Armed Forces, this theory could have been applied to him in these 
cases. The court, however, chose a more demanding standard and 
one perhaps more appropriate to the defendant’s status as a civilian. 
The decision finds Fujimori criminally liable under a specific form of 
mediated authorship: the commission through the use of an 
organized apparatus of power. The German jurist Roxin is credited 
with the development of the theory, which he based, among others, 
on the study of the trials of Eichmann and Staschinsky.9 Under this 
doctrine, Fujimori is “the man standing behind” a structure 
deliberately set up to commit crimes; he has the control of the event 
(dominio del hecho) and the power to produce the result through his 
control of the apparatus that is answerable to him. 
This was the doctrine applied in 1985 by the Federal Court of 
Appeals of Buenos Aires in sentencing Videla and other Junta 
members for the crimes of the “dirty war.” It has been applied also 
by German courts in relation to crimes committed by high officials 
of the former German Democratic Republic in connection with the 
enforcement of the Berlin Wall and more recently by the 
international criminal courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
 
 9. See Judgment Against Fujimori, supra note 1, at 803-04, ¶ 725. 
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Interestingly, it had been applied only a few months earlier by 
another Peruvian court that had found Abimael Guzman, the leader 
of Sendero Luminoso, guilty of crimes committed by his 
subordinates. In its decision on Fujimori, the Court established that 
the doctrine requires several items of factual foundation, all of which 
are amply documented in connection with the evidence on record: (1) 
the existence of the organization, in this case the Grupo Colina; (2) 
the “automatic” or “mechanical” functioning of the enterprise so that 
the leader can expect the result without having to impart a specific 
order; (3) the functional requirement of a specific power to command 
and expect obedience; (4) the separation of the organization from the 
application of the law; (5) the fungible nature of those occupying the 
operative positions in the apparatus so that Fujimori could expect his 
order to be performed by these or by other members of the group; 
and (6) the very high disposition on the part of the operatives to 
perform the illegal orders they received.10 It can be readily perceived 
that this doctrine requires a very detailed gathering and analysis of 
evidence that is made all the more complex because the apparatus is 
precisely set up to provide plausible deniability. In fact, 
clandestineness and denial are of the essence of the crimes of State. 
For that reason, the decision is all the more impressive because it so 
persuasively demonstrates the existence of all the elements of 
Fujimori’s responsibility in the commission of “system crimes” of 
this nature. 
So far we have very rightly lauded the Peruvian judiciary for this 
remarkable achievement. It is worth noting that it might have never 
been possible without the contribution of many other persons and 
institutions in Peruvian society and beyond. The human rights 
organizations of Peru mobilized public support for the trial and 
marshaled legal resources in facilitating access by the families of the 
victims of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos. Much earlier, however, they 
had presented a formidable challenge to authoritarianism and 
criminal violence even while under attack from the State and from 
Sendero Luminoso alike. At the beginning of the current democratic 
stage, they contributed enormously to the success of another major 
institution of accountability, the Truth and Reconciliation 
 
 10. Id. at 802-280. 
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Commission (“TRC”), which produced a ground-breaking report in 
2003. Although most of the recommendations in that report remain 
unimplemented, the strength of its findings continue to dominate the 
debates about the years of “dirty war” in Peru, and provide a basis 
for what can no longer be denied on ideological or political grounds. 
The report of the TRC and the Fujimori decision should stand as the 
crowning achievement of the efforts of Peruvian civil society to 
reckon with a painful past in ways that consolidate democracy and 
the rule of law. 
The readers of American University International Law Review 
have before them the executive summary of the decision of the three-
judge panel that sat as a special criminal section of the Peruvian 
Supreme Court. It conducted the trial over more than a year of open 
hearings. It is worth noting that last December the conviction was 
affirmed by a five-member appellate panel of the Supreme Court in a 
unanimous decision.11 The Supreme Court additionally affirmed the 
penalties imposed for each of the counts, amounting to a twenty-five 
year prison sentence.12 
With this groundbreaking case, the Peruvian judiciary makes an 
invaluable contribution to the growing trend in domestic and in 
international jurisdictions to ensure that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are not allowed to go unpunished. This is an 
imperative of international law in effect since Nuremberg. Only in 
recent decades, however, have there been deliberate efforts to make 
it a reality. To be sure, the path towards accountability will never be 
smooth or consistent. There will be inordinate pressures to reverse 
these gains and to reward torturers and murderers in the name of a 
misunderstood “national reconciliation” or because of the belief that 
the necessity of peace should always trump justice. That is why it is 
of the most urgent priority to analyze the Fujimori decision, to 
disseminate it and discuss it, and to insist that others in different 
parts of the world borrow a page from Peru and take on the hard task 
of redressing human rights violations through accountability. 
 
 
 11. Analytica, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. 
